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Abstract
“Ici on noie les algériens:” France’s Repression of the
1961 Algerian Massacre
On the 17th of October 1961, 30,000 Muslims gathered throughout the streets of
Paris in the peaceful protest of a curfew, which had been imposed in 1961 on all French
Muslims from Algeria as an attempt to prevent any further FLN movement. Orders were
given to arrest and suppress the protesters by any means. At the end of the night, bodies
were found in the Seine. The victims were Algerian. The police announced that 14,000
men had been arrested, 200 men injured, and only 2 killed. Around 200 Algerian men
were never heard from and corpses began appearing in the Seine. Yet the police never
addressed the bodies. The truth was hidden. The police covered up the extent of the
violence, and the French public overlooked the state discrimination that passed through
their streets. In the past 60 years, information and documents have slowly resurfaced
concerning the “forgotten” event. Why did members of the French state and the French
police react callously to a call for peace? What led France to repress such injustices?
How did information from the event resurface? I will investigate the methods of how
France’s state repressed a moment in history that affected thousands of lives. This thesis
will pursue the issue of how a nation could ignore the injustices inflicted upon their
people by their leaders. The research will be based on qualitative primary and secondary
sources that present accurate information on the events and range from days after the
event to 50 years after. The events will be examined to understand why they were a taboo
and why they were given such an extent of power as to be hidden from the nation and the
world. The issue of state violence shows up in different points throughout French history
and the Algerian massacre is not a stand-alone event of repression. While moments of
October 17th, 1961 will forever remain lost due to repressive acts by the French state, a
collective narrative has developed from the anarchives (unofficial archives) and official
archives built by a process of recovery.
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INTRODUCTION
Decades have passed and memories have faded, but the forgotten Algerian
massacre in Paris grows ever more relevant. Years of colonial rule indoctrinated the
French military with harsh tactics of governing, following them to the streets of Paris.
The progression of the Algerian war only increased tensions between the two nations and
provoked outbreaks of violence. On October 17, 1961, FLN demonstrators marched in
peaceful solidarity against the discrimination of the Parisian police in boycott of a night
curfew that had been imposed upon Algerians. The intention of peace quickly dissolved
as violent tactics by the police wreaked havoc upon the demonstrators. Arrests and deaths
irrevocably changed the lives of thousands of Algerians; yet the state quickly overlooked
the displacement and massacre of a people, moving on to focus more on growing
France’s political and economic position in the world. Instead of the demonstrations
bringing political change, the police only further stifled the voice of the Algerian people
in France.
This thesis seeks to examine the events of October 17th, 1961 through a narrative
on the historical events leading up to 1961, the planning of the FLN demonstrations, the
days of the FLN demonstrations, and the decades following the event. I will discuss the
reaction of the police and the public to understand their role in the repression of memory
that has prevented the story of October 17, 1961 from being openly shared and
acknowledged. Furthermore, the release of stories and documents will be examined to
determine the extent of the state’s complicity in the event and why the revealing of events
1

happened when they did. The Algerian massacre impacted thousands of people, yet the
event became a taboo topic by the very people involved in its undertaking.
This thesis is composed of four chapters. The chapters present the story of the
events of October 17, 1961, leading chronologically to the present. Chapter one
approaches the relationship of France and Algeria from the beginning of their colonial
relationship. This provides valuable information for understanding the foundation of
superiority vs. inferiority instituted by France upon the Algerian people. Early on, the
French state demonstrated the approach of repressing memory, neglecting to address
incidents of violence that took place under their rule during colonialism. This is where
the repression of memory is seen to originate. Chapter one brings us to the beginning of
the Algerian war and the outbreak of political violence in France perpetrated by the FLN
and the OAS. Chapter two is the narrative of the weeks leading up to the days of, and the
days after the FLN demonstrations. This chapter seeks to provide thorough information
on the event, presenting the depth of the state’s role in the violence, which unfolded the
days and weeks after the massacre. This chapter looks at the reactions of the police, the
public, and the press to understand where the repression of memory develops. In chapter
three, three primary sources will be analyzed to provide examples of the different ways in
which “memory” of the event arose. These primary sources are a satirical newspaper, a
fictional book, and a documentary. These sources come to surface at different moments
in the decades following 1961. The Conclusion will look back over the resurfacing of
stories and documents since 1961 specifically what makes these years significant and
what has been recovered of the memory repressed by the French state.

2

CHAPTER ONE: Remembering the Ties between Colonial France and Algeria
(Historical Context)

In 1830, France began its colonial take-over of Algeria, leading to the restricting
domination that France would seek to enforce upon the people and country of Algeria for
the next 150 years. The authority of the French government infiltrated every aspect of the
Algerian life, denying the social, political, and economic spheres. Algeria and France
founded their relationship on superiority versus inferiority with France as the dominating
nation, who sought to control the lives of Algerians. After the 1830s, France claimed the
Algerian territory as an extension of France in which Algerians were regulated as French
subjects1. Labeled as “French subjects,” Algerians were not included in the full French
membership, essentially remaining without citizenship for decades. The French sought
assimilation, asking Algerians to forget their ethnicity and for males to eventually
become French citizens. Yet such citizenship was not granted to Algerian males. The
French officials rationed that this decision was a “temporary” act of exclusion that would
be resolved as time passed, eventually providing Algerian males citizenship.2 In the
hopes of assimilation, French guidance established French law and rulings over local
Algerian ruling by decrees in 1854 and in 1866.3 The French colonial occupation lasted

Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War the Remaking of
France, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006) 20.
2
Shepard, Todd, 21-22.
3
Shepard, Todd, 26.
1
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until 1962 when Algeria attained its independence after eight years of brutal fighting
against imperial France. Yet, the repercussions of the 150 years of French colonial
influence imposed an unforgettable era of submission and lack of sovereignty in
Algeria’s history. “Freed from the yoke of foreign domination, they are free neither from
its continued pressure on economic, political, and military levels, nor from the pressure
applied by the parasitic strata of their compatriots who enrich themselves by serving as
go-betweens.”4 The lands and resources of Algeria profited the French pocket, taking the
livelihood and pride of Algeria. A continuation of such enforced, humiliating policies
represents the stronghold and dominance France claimed in colonial Algeria. The
restrictions reached further than the economic realm, largely influencing the political
sphere. Upon entering and declaring the lands of Algeria as its own, France announced its
complete sovereignty. The extension of France influenced the decisions, expectations,
and dreams of the Algerian people. As a consequence of such colonialism, the politics of
inclusion and exclusion resulted in upheaval.
Following the French Revolution, the French nation declared the motto, “Liberté,
égalité, fraternité”, to encapsulate its ideals. This motto was to ensure the implementation
that all men deserved the right at birth to be treated with liberty, equality, and fraternity.
At the time, the principles applied only to men of white French birthright, excluding
already the women of the French nation. Soon France extended this principle to limit the
domestic rights of Algerians in their occupied home. While colonizing Algeria, the
idealized motto of the French became just that, a romanticized, unattainable aspiration for
anyone, even the French, to meet. French sovereignty categorized the people of Algeria
Lorcin, Patricia E., Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, Ed.
by Patricia E. Lorcin. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006) XIV.
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as “subjects,” and in 1834 an annexation ordered the inclusion of Algeria’s four million
Muslim majority to be ushered into the family as French “subjects” as discussed at the
beginning of the chapter. 5 This change in politics finally granted the people of Algeria a
legal position, no longer foreigners in their own home. The categorization placed them
under the subjugation of French sovereignty but due to the Koranic law, further
restricting them to be governed under a “régime d’exception—this still excluded them
from full citizenship and political equality.”6 France continued to hold its “subjects” at an
arm’s length. A decade later, the category of “French national noncitizen” replaced the
term “subject”. This term merely provided a stronger “association” between the French
and Algerians without specifically giving any additional political liberties to Algerians.
Keeping with its custom, France made an exception in 1865, extending French
nationality to some and offering French citizenship to a few “’indigenous’ men and their
descendants.”7 Those who revoked their local law or civil status (such as Koranic—
Islam, mosaic—Jewish) could “benefit from the rights open to a French citizen.” bringing
reform and according French nationality to a small number of Algerians. 8 It declared,
“The Muslim native is French” if regulated under French law. Yet this did not signify
citizenship for all. And most, who were able to gain full citizenship, rejected the offer as
it meant giving up their own local law and thus their religion and ethnic group.9 The
connotation of nationality brought about assumptions that the decree gave Algerians
5

Dunwoodie, Peter. “Assimilation, Cultural Identity, and Permissible Deviance in
Francophone Algerian Writing of the Interwar Years.” Algeria and France, 1800-2000:
Identity, Memory, Nostalgia. Ed. by Patricia E. Lorcin. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse
University Press, 2006)
6 Dunwoodie, Peter, 68.
7
Shepard, Todd, 26.
8
Dunwoodie, Peter, 68. And Shepard, Todd, 26.
9
Shepard, Todd, 27.
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more liberties. But the French did not desire to associate with the “backwardness” of
“Muslim” Algerians. Through this demand, France was asking Algerians to deny their
religion and lifestyle, continually implementing exclusionary tactics. In 1881, only 144
Algerians of Mosaic civil status had rejected their local law to become French citizens.
Between 1865-1899 of four million “Muslim” population, only 1,309 men completed the
citizenship application.10 France saw Islam and Judaism as the obstacle between the
possible complete solidarity of the two nations, and they were not willing to compromise
their plan for assimilation. First introduced in 1874 then added to in 1881, the French
began the employment of Le Code de l’indigénat (the indigenous code, or the native
code) reemphasizing the French military’s control on “natives” or “indigène”. While
there was already a penal code in place, this native code further marginalized Algerians
by instituting 33 infractions upon “natives.”11 This law allowed French officials the
power to fine or imprison “Muslim” Algerians if they were accused of disrupting law and
order.12 Despite Algerian “Muslims” claim to French nationality after 1865, they
possessed little political right, and the small amount they had was further diminished as a
result to the native code. In 1881, this open “French national noncitizen” category was
permanently instituted as the key to association and not assimilation, allowing for the
appearance of inclusion while still obviously excluding Algerians from belonging.
Despite French nationals being the minority, “Muslim” Algerians—the majority, were the
people being persecuted.

10

Shepard, Todd, 29 and 27.
Shepard, Todd, 31.
12 Ageron, Charles Robert. Modern Algeria, translated by Michael Brett. (London:
Hurst and Company, 1991) 53.
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The history of France is dotted with its incapacity to accommodate difference.
Before the colonization of Algeria, the French Revolution was fought to end the division
of these differences and promote human universalism. “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” was at
the forefront of the French ideal and intended to benefit all; under the guise of a civilizing
mission, France pushed these values upon the Algerian people, believing them beneficial
to the betterment of Algeria. Instead of encouraging equality, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man enhanced those with already registered status and further neglected those
who were seen as inferior, prompting, “violent rejection of all privileges based on
origin.”13 The continued exceptions and “temporary deferral” to the law encouraged the
same outrage that sparked the French Revolution. Thus people without the deserved
rights of life sought out that liberty, resulting in clashes. “Moments of counter discourse”
echo throughout French history books as a result of “the dogma of French equality” that
is never fully implemented and often rather exclusionary.14 Algerians did not identity or
fully accept the ideals and ideas of the French, as they were not reaping the benefits of
them.
In spite of the French Republic promoting its universalism and “civilizing
mission,” the persistent discrimination that was proving to be more than temporary
created lack of solidarity between the two nations. France did not feel Algeria was
civilized or deserving of the responsibility of being a “French citizen”, and Algerians felt
repressed by the French disregard of their intelligence, beliefs, and personal values that

13

Noiriel, Gerard. “Immigration: Amnesia and Memory.” French Historical Studies, Vol.
19, No. 2 (Autumn, 1995) 371.
14
Hammerschlag, Sarah. Review of Maurice Samuels, The Right to Difference: French
Universalism and the Jews. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2016)
264.
7

imperial France trampled over.15 But this animosity did not stop the promotion of tourism
in Algeria during colonialism; the French majority merely overlooked the truth of the
situation. People from all over the world came to Algeria to see the sights the French
described, to get a feel for the “foreign” life that the French stressed was so idyllic. The
information and guidebooks of the time contained knowledge on the geographical sites
important to Algeria, and these books built on the words recited by previous travel
narratives, believing that “tout a été dit sur Alger” (Everything has been said about
Algeria). Over a period of 30 years (1830-1860), 600 hundred books were written that
reiterated the same several arguments: where to visit, what to see. Nothing new was
written or known. While these narratives thoroughly described what a visit to the city
should include, they lacked an accurate comprehension of colonial life. Instead of
emphasizing the culture of Algerians (Muslim or Jewish) and the lack of control they
possessed in their homes, the focus was on the control the French had in the foreign
atmosphere. The guidebooks lumped Algerians as “foreign”, which meant orientalism to
all French. The Algerian lifestyle illustrated an atmosphere of tranquility and celebrated
ethnic customs to tourists, when in reality the French attempted to repress such ethnic ties
by prompting Algerians to revoke local laws in lieu of French citizenship. The French
writers of these guidebooks perceived the relationship between the ruler and the subjects
as they saw fit, remembering the good and forgetting the bad. But such innate repression
was embedded in the foundation of the relationship, preventing a genuine understanding
between the two nations that the guides had no idea the vast amounts of vital information

15

Graebner, Seth. “The Unknown and Unloved: The Politics of French Ignorance in
Algeria, 1860-1930.” Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia. Ed.
by Patricia E. Lorcin. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006)
8

that they were not incorporating. Even the most knowledgeable about Algeria’s history
and culture were ignorant to Algerians as a people capable of intelligence, seeing them
solely as foreigners to amuse and obey the interests of the French. Seth Graebner
discusses France’s ignorance of the Algerian people, labeling the Algerians as “the
Unknown and Unloved” during colonialism. While France had invaded the nation of
Algeria and was profiting from its goods, there was no desire to understand Algerians.
Thus, Algerians remained “the Unknown and Unloved.” Graebner presents text that
“argues that the problem was a gap between French perceptions and reality.”16
France dominated the social, political, and economic spheres of Algeria at this
time. The ideals of France were imposed upon all life of Algeria, and propaganda
infiltrated the international perspective. People assumed the French knew the people and
nation, yet the French created their own identity for Algeria, placing this vibrant nation
into a banal summary of touristic places and generalized “indigenous foreign people”
lumping Algerians with the Orientals. The French assumed that the exclusion of
Algerians would be temporary, as the French government cited all Algerians as able to
become a French citizen since the 1870s.17 Yet Algeria and its people remained
“unknown and unloved” and ignored, not gaining the liberties promised to them and
living excluded in their own land for decades. The lack of knowledge presented a barrier
to the advancement of Algeria and its people, repressing and “sabotaging” their future.18
As a consequence of the cultural and political repression, Algerians rose up to
fight against sovereign France. For decades, the fear wrought by violence manipulated

Graebner, Seth. 50.
Shepard, Todd. 47.
18 Graebner, Seth. 59.
16
17
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Algerians to adhere to the exclusionary culture and endure the “subject” lifestyle. But the
violence and lack of liberty reached a breaking point in 1954 when fighting erupted in
Algeria. The FLN: Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Party) began a
guerrilla war against the French in protest. Algeria had requested that France lessen its
rule, and while France had agreed, after WWI, France went back on its promise. By the
Battle of Algiers (1956-1957), FLN were in full attack mode, increasing their violent
attacks by bombing urban areas in Algeria. In 1959, Charles de Gaulle came to the
decision that Algerians had the right to their own future. And so in 1962, the Algerian
War of Independence ended and Algeria won its deserved independence.
France would not willingly give up its prized colony. So much had been invested
into this “civilizing mission” that turned into a 150-year occupation. France shared, or
imposed, its identity through culture, economics, and politics. The assimilation of French
ideals appeared to be a success despite the republic’s lack of inclusion. In this sense,
France suppressed the idea of losing those French subjects that the French had never
really allowed to become French. The Republic was not ready to lose all the wealth and
power that the French had built through colonialism only desiring to continue excluding
the people and benefitting from the colony. They sought continued marginalization of
Algerians rather than lose anything themselves. But the parasitic relationship had to
change. Despite the collective history of the colonization, the distinct experiences
resulted in differing visions of the future. France wanted to remain sovereign over
Algeria. And Algeria wanted independence. Violence, influenced by French colonial
behavior, was an integral part of the Franco-Algerian relationship, putting a strain on the

10

possibility of a peaceful reconciliation from the beginning.19 When war erupted, the
collective upheaval proved to threaten the French identity.20
Algerian immigrants began moving to France largely after World War II, as many
men were recruited to fight in the war and then remained in France after the war ended.
They were additionally recruited to work. Families soon relocated to join the men. In a
change of positions, Algerians entered France. Yet the reality did not change. Algerians
were now a minority amongst the French, and the exclusionary practices augmented.
Algerians were picked out easily in a crowd, and the French rarely associated with the
minority. Even amongst the immigrants, the Algerians were regarded poorly and looked
down upon. The location of being in another country did not stop Algerians from
supporting their brothers’ fight for independence. Manifestations and demonstrations
became a regular occurrence in Paris where the largest population of Algerian immigrants
lived in France. The FLN (same as the FLN party in Algeria) was the principal nationalist
party, and the party that commenced the independence movement in France. Affiliations
of the FLN abounded in Paris and struck at any opportunity to show their support abroad.
The Algerian Independence war was being fought in Algeria and in the streets of Paris:
FLN versus OAS (Organisation armée secrète). The OAS was a right-wing terrorist
group led by French military deserters who came together in January 1961, uniting antiFLN groups in hopes to prevent Algerian independence.21 The groups attacked through
brutal acts of sabotage and assassination. In response to concessions of Algeria becoming
independent, the OAS violently demonstrated their disagreement, and the FLN
Gallois, William. A History of Violence in the Early Algerian Colony, (Basingstoke,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
20
Lorcin, Patricia E., XXI.
21
Shepard, Todd, 89.
19
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accordingly retaliated. There were many strikes and protests by the FLN and the OAS
with intermittent attacks by both groups. As a result of the increasing outbreaks of
violence during these demonstrations and fear of monetary support from the FLN being
sent back to Algeria, the Prefecture of Police in Paris amplified security and restrictions
upon the immigrants.22 The superiority of the French repositioned to Paris as Algerian
immigrants grew in number, causing the authority of the French police to come through
in restrictive policies. As the French government imposed specific restrictions and
excluded political opportunities in Algeria, such dominant behavior persisted in France as
groups like the OAS formed and the Algerian war raged. Yet in Paris, Algerians
possessed less leverage for political power than in Algeria, still seen as inferiors as they
were neither European nor Christian.23 The blatant differences in ethnicity and culture
separated the two groups of people and reminded France of the losing “civilizing
mission” they had exerted so much time and energy on.
The characteristics of colonial Algeria repositioned to France when the Algerian
War began. Instead of accepting the inevitable independence of Algeria, France clung to
the past’s precious memory of total domination and control. The once imperial nation
struggled to overcome the resentment from the imminent loss of their colony, seeing it as
“rightfully French”. Despite the ongoing war, people still feared challenging the colonial
dogma that France had promoted for centuries. As the tensions grew, France only added
to the friction by increasing restrictions and allowing police violence as will be explained
in the following chapter. The repressive acts enforced by France in colonial Algeria

House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory.
(Oxford: University Press, 2006)
23 Pine, Savannah. “Conscription, Citizens, and French Algeria,” 46.
22
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persisted, yet the French felt they were losing their colonial territory. In hopes to save
Algeria France, the French Revolution’s promise of equality was fulfilled through the
Constitution of 1958, which established full citizenship to all adult Algerian males and
females “with local civil status.”24 The long ago promised French citizenship had finally
become true. Through the decades of attempted “assimilation”, the French government
failed in attaining equality but managed well at encouraging French racism.25 As more
Algerians immigrated to France, the institutionalized racism from decades of unchecked
exclusion presented problems for the nation of “égalité.” France struggled to cope with
the leadership of colonial trained officers and how to treat colonial raised Algerians
integrating into the Paris metropolitan sphere. The French government had no plan of
how to manage the deep division between Algerians and French, which was only growing
larger as the Algerian War progressed.
From Algeria to France:
On October 17, 1961, a manifestation of 30,000 Algerian immigrants gathered on
the streets and bridges of Paris. The peaceful protest rallied against the government’s
newly imposed night curfew, which stated that all Algerian immigrants had to be home
by 8:30pm and could not leave their homes until 5:30am. As the violence grew in Algeria
regarding the war, so the turmoil deepened in France. Countless demonstrations erupted
weekly, instigated by the FLN and counter-attacks came soon after from the OAS.
Tensions were high amongst the people and the police. The eruption occurred on a night
of an expression of “fraternité”. Algerians were marching in solidarity for their rights as
well as for those of their brothers. The march intended to bring attention to the Algerian
24
25

Shepard, Todd, 46.
Shepard, Todd, 47.
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people and to spread news of their plight. But the police saw the unity of the Algerians as
bold defiance. In turn, the police marched in full force exploiting their power in violence.
The march was halted as the police brought out their batons and guns. The people
disintegrated under the thumb of the law; thousands were arrested and dozens murdered.
A night that was meant to bring support and harmony instead resulted in death and
denial.26
Colonial dominance provided France with the ideal implementation of authority.
France paraded its power and took possession of other nations, and in return brought the
French way of life to the colonies. The French principles encouraged assimilation—
become French and act French. Yet they sought division from these immigrants, wanting
to retain their own national identity and remain separate from the immigrants coming in.
While the French colonial institution encouraged French identity, the French did not view
the Algerians as privileged enough to deserve this identity. Hypocrisy thrived through the
demands of colonial France. Even though the people recognized the injustices occurring,
the discussion of such exclusive or violent acts by the French was deemed taboo.27 As an
acknowledged rule, when France “forgot” or repressed memories of demeaning and
humiliating events, nothing was done. This repression of memory can be connected to the
term collective memory, which refers to “that which is conveyed, maintained, and
celebrated by all instruments of public opinion (scholarly works, manuals, monuments,

Einaudi, Jean-Luc. La Bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961. (Paris: Seuil, 1991)
House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory.
27 Lorcin, Patricia E., XXI
26
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and official ceremonies).”28 Yet in the French situation, this collective memory has been
lost.
Due to the aggressive acts committed in the name of the “civilizing mission” or
colonization and the desire to preserve such authority, the collective memory of France
has willfully forgotten some of its past. Patricia Lorcin states, ”Whether such
restructuring is a subconscious reaction to personal trauma or a conscious attempt to
perpetrate national or individual myths by erasing aspects of the past that are contentious,
it constitutes the politics of memory discourses.”29 This brings up the question of why
and how? Why would France refuse to acknowledge their exclusionary policies in
colonial Algeria? Days when they were so convinced of their mission to civilize the
world. Why would France repress the memory of their violent actions against Algerians?
How does an entire nation, society “forget” an event? How does something so influential
in French history remain hidden?
In reference to the idea of the French nation as having “lost”, “forgotten”, and
“repressed” memory, this thesis is noting the French possession of collective memory in
which the nation shared a group memory in awareness of political and social occurrences.
The different theories of collective memory will be presented to understand the reasoning
behind the united group mentality of 1960s France, specifically what took place in the
year of 1961. The theory of collective memory began with none other than a Frenchman,
Maurice Halbwachs, who wrote La mémoire collective. According to Halbwachs,
memory can be collected, distributed, and passed on amongst social groups of all sizes.
Groups have the benefit of remembering more together, than an individual will remember
28
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alone, as many memories collaborate to form a collective memory that relies on the
group.30 Paul Ricoeur, a French philosopher and historian emphasizes the relations
among individuals within the group and the sharing of memory depending on the
relationship. Ricoeur connects collective identity to his theory of narrative identity,
noting that narratives provide an understanding of connections from one individual to
another. According to David Leichter, who studied Pau Picoeur, collective memory
“makes sense of a shared path.”31 In Vichy France, the mindset of collaboration and
indoctrination prompted wartime trauma that the French collective memory resisted
remembering.32 In this thesis, collective memory will be used to demonstrate the shared
path taken by the French in response to violent state repression and discrimination.
Taboos, while often avoided, do not have the power to repress the magnitude of
information or knowledge that has been “lost”. More than the result of hypocrisy or
misdoings, the collective memory loss of France stems from a much grander issue. Early
on French colonialism provoked an exclusionary and repressive political and social
atmosphere that separated them from “Muslim” Algerians. Not even the fulfilled promise
of French citizenship mollified the institutionalized racism the French government
demonstrated in Algeria and returned back to France with. The French Revolution fought
the issue of exclusion and was thought to have resolved the injustice. But evidence in the
context of Algeria provides proof that this is not the case. Instead, the exclusionary
elements have persisted. While the Algerian massacre of October 17, 1961 impacted the
Assmann, Jan. “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, No.
65, Cultural History/Cultural Studies (Spring - Summer, 1995) 127.
31 Leichter, David J. “Collective Identity and Collective Memory in the Philosophy of
Paul Ricoeur,” Etudes Ricoeuriennes/ Ricoeur Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2012) 114.
32 Scullion, Rosemarie. “Unforgettable: History, Memory, and the Vichy Syndrome,
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 (Winter, 1999) 12.
30

16

lives of thousands, the event was not discussed publicly in France for two decades.
France carried these exclusionary values to the colonies, brought them back, and the
nation, despite attempts to revoke such inequality, still reflects such exclusive actions
today.

17

CHAPTER TWO: October 17th, 1961
“The day that Paris did not stir”
—Pierre Vidal-Naquet

The exclusionary practices of the French police erupted on the evening of October
17th, 1961 when 30,000 Algerians gathered throughout the streets of Paris in peaceful
demonstration against a night curfew imposed by the Prefect of Police. In this chapter, I
will examine the accounts of the evening of October 17th and the days after in attempts to
gain a deeper understanding of the event alongside the role of the French police and the
reaction of the public in regards to the demonstrations. What led to such a violent evening
that has since been labeled “the Algerian massacre”? How were the French police
involved and to what extent does their involvement make them responsible? What were
the repercussions of such a traumatic experience to the French nation? I will compile
several secondary sources to interpret the “what happened” on October 17th., 1961. Due
to the numerous testimonies, accounts vary according to how the events of the evening
took place. Primarily two books in this chapter will provide information about the
otherwise limited evidence that has appeared in the decades following 1961. With the
research of several renowned French historians, I have constructed an accepted timetable,
which tracks the progress of the demonstration. This chapter will be compromised of
sections dividing the concentrated events leading up to October 17th, 1961 and the
responses to La Bataille de Paris (The Battle of Paris).
18

For this chapter, two main texts will be referenced to establish the research
gathered from the demonstrations of October 17th, 1961—the weeks leading up and the
days after, as well as the reactions to the demonstrations. The first text by Jim House and
Neil MacMaster in 2006, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, provides an
in-depth investigation of French repression through newly uncovered archives and past
resources. The state terror is narrowed back to colonial France, which prompts the violent
state tactics in Paris. House and MacMaster find the Algerian massacre arose from
encouraged state discrimination and a repressed collective memory. The second text is La
Bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961 written by Jean-Luc Einaudi in 1991 in which
narratives of October 17th, 1961 are recorded and retraced in this astonishing account of
the Battle of Paris. The repression is devastating as it is revealed the lives that are lost and
violence that is unleashed throughout the streets of Paris. Einaudi gathers a culmination
of narratives, forgotten for decades, that tell one of the saddest stories of the French
government.
The demonstrations occurred throughout Paris, and while hundreds of people
witnessed the proceedings, the biased social and political atmosphere of Paris quieted
public knowledge of the event. To this day the events in the evening of October 17th
remain a mystery. Due to government conflicts and the suppression of information
regarding the evening of October 17th, data and documentation for the demonstration are
limited, yet since the release of the archives in the late 1990s, more information on the
event has come forth through the aid of several historians. For the beginning of this
chapter, a narrative of the events will provide a framework for the events of October 17th,
1961, presenting the reason for the demonstrations, the planning leading up to the
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demonstrations, and the involvement of Algerians, police, and Parisians in what came to
be known as the Algerian massacre.
Narrative of the event, October 17th, 1961:
On the night of October 17th, 1961, crowds of Algerians gathered across the
bridges and streets of Paris, standing in the rain protesting against the discrimination that
battered them. The war against Algeria had been waging for eight years without reprieve
and the violence had spread from the lands of Algeria to those of France. Many Algerians
came to France during World War II and remained in hopes of living a better life than the
one offered by colonial Algeria. Yet the opportunities were slimmer, and the
discrimination was significant abroad; France consisted of the same exclusions that
stifled the growth of Algerians in their homeland. The promised gift of equality that the
French boasted of did not exist. In 1954 when battles for independence broke out in
Algeria, hope began to grow in the hearts of Algerians. Their brothers in France echoed
the victorious cries, and soon an uprising of FLN began growing in the neighborhoods
and bidonvilles (slums) of Paris. Members of the FLN in Paris believed that making the
Algerian plight of inequality heard was their duty.
Week leading up to manifestations:
In 1961, as a war was being fought in Algeria, a war also erupted amongst the
streets of Paris between the OAS and the FLN with the police in the midst. For months,
the political groups went back and forth, scheming against the other. The intensity of the
plots slowly gained ground and worsened, leading to unidentifiable corpses of North
Africans being found in the Seine during September and October of 1961.33 The police
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were assumed to be involved in the deaths, but the Prefect and his senior officers denied
all responsibility despite several reports of accusations against them. The Algerians
feared the strength and influence of the French police, yet in their helpless position, their
complaints were disregarded. As a ramification of the augmenting violence in the city,
the police were encouraged to restrict the liberty of those who were causing said disorder
in Paris. Maurice Papon, the Prefect of Police in Paris in 1961, is seen as an emblem of
the corrupt French state to this day. A Nazi collaborator during World War II, the French
government specifically chose Papon to lead the police of Paris during a time of
disruption when “the battle” against the FLN began in 1958 because of Papon’s extensive
background experience in policing colonial insurgencies. In order to grasp the full extent
of how corrupt the French government was, one must understand the man that the
government placed in charge of their policing system for almost a decade. Papon came to
his position of Prefect through the mentorship of Jean Baylot, who modeled the
discriminatory campaign against Algerians.34 From his involvement in colonial Algeria,
Papon arrived in Paris with a position of power and habits of violence. In 1995, Papon
was tried for his involvement in a heinous crime of the 1940s: deporting Jews to
internment camps. Papon brought thousands of Jews to their death and yet was given
control of the Parisian police and assigned to protect the public from harm. Several years
in Algeria then led Papon to Morocco, where he was brought in to “reinforce the position
of the colonial elites through repression rather than any policy of reform or concession to
the nationalists.”35 As his training in Vichy France, French Algeria, and colonial
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Morocco taught him, Papon utilized the repressive state tactics of institutionalized racism
to increase discrimination in the battle of Paris. The morning of October 5th, 1961, the
Prefect of Paris police, Maurice Papon implemented “un couvre-feu” (a night curfew).
From 8:30pm to 5:30am every day, the night curfew obliged Algerians to stay out of the
streets and in their homes. The only exception was a job conflict, but even such access
had to be approved by the sector coordinator of their banlieue (neighborhood)36.
Immigrants typically kept identity papers on hand, which provided police the ability to
separate Algerians from other immigrants.37 While the curfew was difficult to enforce, an
increase in police force and aggressiveness encouraged complicity within the majority of
Algerians for a time. But the discrimination solely against Algerians did not rest
unchallenged for long. The additional obstacle on their already limited freedom became
too much for the FLN party. Algerians were no longer solely immigrants in a foreign
country; they were enemies, targeted and punished for criminal acts that were not the
fault of the majority. It is in this setting of this social turmoil that the events in the
evening of the FLN’s peaceful protests unfolded.
Two days after the ordinance by Papon, discussion of boycotting the night curfew
was already in effect. FLN thought it urgent to show resistance and refusal to be treated
in such a lowly manner.
Dans ce cas, vous pouvez et nous devons ici sur place mettre au pied du mur le
peuple français38.-Mohammedi Saddek
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(In this case, we can and we must here on this spot back the French people into a
corner.)
The boycott was to provide an opportunity of Algerian support against discrimination.
While the Algerians were foreign, the FLN did not believe they were not to be deemed
inferior to the French. Yet this is precisely what the order by the Prefect of police
encouraged: a strict division that prohibited Algerians from living a normal life in Paris.
The FLN decided to peacefully protest such blatant discrimination. Three days before the
manifestations on October 14th, Mohamed Zouaoui, the leader of FLN operations in
Paris, sent out an order of a campaign: boycott the curfew. The order declared that ALL
Algerians, men, women, children, and elderly were to participate in the demonstrations;
those who failed to participate would “be the ‘object of very serious sanctions,’”
according to the text instructions for the demonstrations of the 17th of October, which
were found on a FLN member by the police.39 The demonstrations were to be arranged
discreetly as to not raise alarm within the police networks, but information was leaked as
soon as the date of the boycott was decided upon in newspapers in Geneva and Paris.40
Yet the Prefect of Police did not realize the extent of the mobilization until the evening of
16-17 October. It is by this advantage that the FLN were able to organize without much
difficulty at the beginning of the evening. The details of the FLN operation were
unknown, yet the police would take no risk as to be caught unaware and unprepared.
Papon had previously employed an operation that set up police at all key entrances
(portes) of Paris. The day of October 17th, Papon received a copy of the FLN plan,
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containing the arrangements of the demonstrations: the date, the intent of peace, and that
woman and children were to be involved.41 While the majority of the information
regarding the event remained a secret to the police, Papon uncovered enough to
understand the FLN was not seeking revenge for the discriminatory acts against them.
Knowing the pacificist goal of the Algerians, Papon still armed his men with riot sticks,
pistols, and guns. Many of these men had previously fought in colonial Algeria.
Techniques developed in Algeria encouraged disproportionate retaliation of French
military in response to unarmed demonstrations such as in the Sétif massacre of 1945,
where peasant insurgency brought about mass killings conducted by police and armed
forces. Likewise, the colonial authorities practiced regular concealment of these illegal
brutal acts.42 They were not strangers to the tactics of battle, and after the policy issued
by Papon (part of which is below) many no longer felt compelled to contain their
vengeful desire.
« En vue de mettre un terme sans délai aux agissements criminels des terroristes
algériens, des mesures nouvelles viennent d’être décidées par la préfecture de
police. En vue d’en faciliter l’exécution, il est conseille de la façon la plus
pressante aux travailleurs musulmans algériens de s’abstenir de circuler la nuit
dans les rues de Paris et de la banlieue parisienne, et plus particulièrement de 20
h 30 à 5 h 30 du matin. » (With view to putting an end without delay to the
criminal acts of Algerian terrorism, new measures have just been decided by the
Prefect of Police. In order to facilitate execution, it is advisable in the most urgent
way for Algerian Muslim workers to refrain from circulating at night in the streets
41
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of Paris and the suburbs of Paris, and more particularly from 8:30pm to 5:30 in
the morning.)43
One police officer, Raoul Letard, is quoted as saying, “and our dream, we would say to
ourselves, was that one day, one day at least they are going to do the bloody stupid thing
of coming out all together… and we would be able to pay things back.44” A protest with
women, children, and the elderly would not possess the capabilities of ever
overwhelming these men. Instead of fearing possible violence, the police were
anticipating the possibility of revenge.
Plans of the FLN:
“La Bataille de Paris” (The Battle of Paris) began weeks before the
manifestations were seen on the streets. In response to the night curfew, the FLN
strategically planned the peaceful wide-scale demonstration so as to draw attention and
inspire support for their cause, while simultaneously making it clear to the police that
they were not afraid. The formation of the FLN unit in Paris was structured for ease of
communication. A meeting was held every week that provided updates to the groups,
which were then dispersed to the more local bidonville groups. As a result, the boycott
mandate quickly spread. The smaller groups were instructed to contain the essential
information until the required time, so that the police could discover less beforehand. As
soon as the initiating order was sent out “encouraging” all members, men women,
children and elderly to come, a plan was made to channel the crowds around Paris in the
most effective manner. Zouaoui divided Paris into three major sectors, allowing separate
parties to enter in through other portes of Paris, but still assemble in the center. These
43
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zones provide a distinct separation between the routes that were used during the
demonstrations and aid in understanding how and where the crowds came from and went
to. The three sectors were as follows: sector 1-the pont de Neuilly-Étoile Axis, sector 2the Boulevards Saint-Michel and Saint-Germain, sector 3-from Opéra to Place de la
République. The sectors were helpful to form small groups based upon the
neighborhoods, in this way less attention could be drawn to the groups and arise
suspicion on their route to the center of Paris. Groups were purposely instructed to exit
from separate metro stations, so the police and public would not be alarmed.

Map 1. FLN March Route on October 17, 1961 in Paris
Above all, the plan of protests called for peace. The FLN orders urged the
necessity of such demeanor as any misstep could result in grave repercussions from the
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police.45 Some FLN officials even went so far as to conduct body searches for weapons.
With the existing social and political situation straining the relationship between the FLN
and the police, the protesters had to appear without fault and united. Thus, the FLN
imposed participation in the protests, threatening penalties for those who did not partake
in the event. While this may have seemed severe, the intentions were clear: support was
required, “‘peacefully, with dignity and an absolute calm.’ ”46 A united front was to be
assumed in hopes that an effective protest that would draw the police’s attention of their
unjust discrimination against Algerians in France. The FLN appropriately anticipated the
obstacles that would accompany the protests. Yet despite their prepared ground rules,
chaos found its way through the peaceful plans.
Day of the Protest:
The day of October 17th, 1961, events unfolded intermittently. The intention was
to promote support of the FLN movement in France while simultaneously opposing the
segregation the police were imposing upon Algerians in France. The demonstrators found
pride in this movement. After being rejected and overlooked for centuries in colonial
Algeria and then decades of discrimination in France, the Algerian people were
enthralled to demonstrate their political and social voice. France had placed Algerians in
a restrictive social sphere, not providing the equality that others were given freely. This is
the moment that the Algerians in France banded together to challenge such restrictions
and demand freedom. The well-prepared plans detailed an evening of peaceful
demonstrations. Yet their ideals of a peaceful evening did not come true.
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“Peace in Algeria”—FLN protesters march in solidarity, October 17th, 1961
The instructions by the FLN to carry out a peaceful demonstration that would not
provoke concern or violence from the police were respected, according to the majority of
witnesses. It is only in the case of police statements that blame is placed upon the
protesters, while in all other circumstances bystanders have attested that it was the police
who wielded the weapons. Demonstrations were intended to take place in the evening,
but several groups preemptively began protesting in the metro, which immediately alerted
the police. This prompted the immediate initiation of Papon’s aforementioned plans.
Police flooded the metro stations and entrances to the city of Paris, waiting for the masses
of people that were to come their way. The majority of demonstrators began to gather in
the evening after work. People traveled from hours outside of Paris to take part in
solidarity. Dressed in their nicest suits and dresses, the groups of men and women
carefully went to their designated sector. Metros were taken only by small groups as to
not draw attention, but the police were already stationed throughout the metros. Other
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groups made their way by bus or simply walking the streets. It was reported that around
8:30-9pm, crowds could be seen crossing the Pont de Neuilly.47
Outbreak of Violence:
As the crowds thickened on the bridge, reports indicate that two shots were fired, chaos
ensuing. Police blocked off the bridge and subjected the crowds to swinging bidules
(batons), resulting in fractured skulls, broken legs, and blood. Police reports accuse an
Algerian protester for the commencement of the shots; officer Pierre Mézière reported,
“the police ‘had to fire as a response to the numerous gun-shots fired by the
demonstrators.’”48 Yet no officers were killed on the bridge during this rampage of
violence. As the violence worsened, tactics turned. Police did not restrain themselves,
hitting protesters as they saw fit with their bidules. Witnesses insisted upon seeing the
bodies of corpses and those who seemed unconscious being thrown into the Seine off of
the bridges. Similar statements were repeated in the other sectors. On the Pont SaintMichel in the second sector, witnesses watched a man cling to a pole, who was then
pulled off by police and thrown into the river. French historian Jean-Luc Einaudi
interviewed Paul Rousseau, a witness of the events on the Pont Clichy, who saw police
grab the bodies of those that had been beaten to death and then toss the bodies into the
Seine.49 The blood was all along the bridges. Throughout the months and weeks
following the demonstrations, these bodies would appear washed up on the sides of the
Seine, a constant reminder of the violence that the police tried to submerge in the Seine.
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Algerian protesters terrified by the police, October 17th, 1961

Famous photograph of an injured Algerian protester—the cover of La Bataille de Paris,
October 17th, 1961
The violence affected all involved in the protest; the police did not refrain from
people due to age nor gender. Primarily, the police sought out men as they were seen as
the root instigators of the demonstrations. Women and children ran away while men tried
to prevent them from being harmed. But nowhere was safe. Those involved were rounded
30

up in the metros, buses, and trains, blocked from leaving the stations or brought to the
stations to receive punishment. In some cases, the protesters were kept for hours,
subjected to random beatings and endless taunts by the police50. This intensity of
aggression persisted around every street of Paris, only beginning to lessen as arrests were
made. Police began to round up Algerian men into buses and open trucks, moving them
to arenas around Paris such as Palais des Sports, the Stade de Coubertin, and the Hôpital
Beaujon. In total, on October 17th, 12, 520 men were arrested. This was almost half of the
people involved in the protests. 12, 520 men were taken into custody by total force of
1,658 police officers, which according to Papon, was “51‘extraordinarily weak’.” Of those
12,520, several hundred were deported back to Algeria, an action encouraged by Roger
Frey, the Minister of Interior. The goal of the police was to clear the protesters from the
streets through arrests and end the demonstrations as soon as they began. Papon was not
interested in the political or social statement the protesters were trying to make. His sole
concern revolved around silencing the protesters and stopping an Algerian supported
movement.

Arrested protesters gathered on a bus, evening of the 17th
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Arrested Algerians waiting to be deported back to Algeria, between 18th-21st October
1961

Map 2. Placement of important buildings/centers used during FLN demonstrations
The arrest of the men did not cease the violence. As men were brought into the
arenas around the city that functioned as detention centers, they were beaten aggressively.
Upon entering any detention building, the protesters had to walk through a line of police,
holding all tools possible of inflicting pain: wooden sticks, bars, bludgeons, etc. that
awaited them. Guy Hébert, a military conscript, witnessed the ferocity, citing that men,

32

who fell, instantly received blows from the police. (130) Ironically, police brought in
doctors and graduate students to some of these locations in attempt to bandage up those
who were seriously injured after 3 to 5 days had passed. These were the same injured
men the police had earlier wounded. Even the seriously injured men remained in the
detention centers until the doctors arrived. While the doctors did not possess the
instruments at hand for any in depth procedures, they were able to wrap bleeding heads
and limbs. They were also instructed to transfer the severely injured to hospitals of
unknown locations at the time. Later on, the logs of these hospitals provided historians
with the factual numbers and notes on men injured and on men that died in the hospital,
etc.52 These logs are the extent of official information regarding victims and/or injuries of
the demonstrations. The FLN carried out their own investigation of these records from 7
hospitals and estimated that an almost 2,300 were injured while only 13 policemen
visited the hospital in concern to injuries.53

Figure 1. The Arrests of 17th October 1961: 12, 520 Algerians Arrested in Paris
House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. 134
Ali Haroun, ‘Le 17 Octobre à Paris’, in 17 Octobre 1961: Mémoire d’une
communauté, Études et Documents (Paris: Actualité de l’Émigration, 1986), 17
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Amongst the injured, the doctors discovered corpses. At most of the arenas and
police stations, dead bodies piled up and were overlooked. As buses of men continued to
arrive, the centers only grew more congested, and the injured were difficult to keep track
of. The doctors were advised to disregard the bodies and continue their work, the police
once again pushing the importance of not later discussing what they had witnessed. This
will be further observed in the documentary analyzed in Chapter 3, in which doctors who
participated in this later told their stories of involvement, despite the police threats of
remaining silent. It was in these situations that even the French involved, outside of the
government, kept quiet as to not draw attention to the situation. So instead, the events did
not gather the recognition they sought or deserved.
Days after, October 18th-20th
October 18th:
The FLN protests did not end as the police hoped. Arrests and beatings would not
dampen the spirit of the Algerian people in their hopes of gaining social peace and
political liberties. La Bataille de Paris continued demonstrating the movement’s
unwavering support, through the most public way, demonstrations. The day after the
manifestations on October 18th, a commercial strike occurred—all Algerians that owned
businesses were to shut down their business for 24 hours, in addition to all workers
protesting again in defiance of the curfew54. This strike was planned by the FLN to
further the extent of the protests and prolong the boycott. The key component was
solidarity throughout the Algerian community. Without the support of the 30,000
members none of the demonstrations would have been possible. But as a result of the
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massive amount of arrests the night before, the numbers of protesters had decreased
immensely.
A protest of 30,000 people, men women, children and the elderly dwindled to
almost 1,000 in the days following the boycott. The police, awaiting the possibility of any
action, blocked all central access routes within the city. On the night of 18th, after the
morning/afternoon of strikes, protests erupted again, mainly focused in the bidonvilles at
La Garenne-Colombes. Due to the dwindling numbers, small groups went throughout
neighborhoods and across bridges, taking a more individualistic approach as the numbers
called for. This allowed the police to covertly arrest and even kill individuals. Several
deaths were reported from that evening, and a couple of bodies of men out protesting that
evening were found a couple days later in the Seine.
October 19th & 20th:
Despite the diminishing supporters—more and more men being arrested; the
women of the FLN remained. The plan of the FLN had incorporated protests of the
curfew to continue on October 19th, but in regards to the massive arrests and men that
were still detained, the supporters were not prepared. Many of the men who had been
arrested left behind wives and children that no longer had someone to lead them. These
women had no way to support their families without their husbands, leaving them
anxious and scared. They had marched alongside their husbands and brothers on the
evening of the 17th, witnesses to the violence that took away the ones they loved most.
For two days, they had little to no knowledge of what was happening with their loved
ones, whether they were safe or even alive. With those thoughts and memories close at
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hand, the women courageously gathered on October 20th, the fourth and last day of the
demonstrations.
Hundreds of women gathered across the metros and central locations of Paris:
Place de la République, Place d’Italie, and the Hôtel de Ville. The crowds carried signs
that expressed their frustration of being kept in the dark, “Free our husbands”, “Down
with the curfew”, and “Total Independence for Algeria”. Throughout the days of
demonstrating, the media grew impatient, hearing rumors of violence, while being strictly
prohibited from taking photos by the Prefect. In order to eliminate the spread of such
“rumors”, the police decided to allow “photo opportunities” during the women’s protest.
As a result, the police instructed all officers to refrain from any violence that would cause
the media to misinterpret the events. But a report states that several women were
hospitalized, while another woman was reported having a miscarriage in the street.55
Despite the police’s “good intentions”, the violence that had been instilled into the
police’s tactics persisted in every area of their work. The police attempted to retain
protesting women and children by bussing them to a local psychiatric hospital. The staff,
unaware of the detainees’ objection, soon discovered the truth and objected alongside the
women, forcing the police to free the women and children. Like the doctors who helped
the men in the arenas, the staff protested against the treatment of the women. Yet before
this instance, the French had not blatantly spoken out against the mistreatment, despite
the fact that the protests happened in the center of Paris. Such large-scale demonstrations
could not simply be ignored. Even without the men, the women still impacted the
movement, emphasizing the voice of all Algerians. Alongside the ability to protest came
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the consequences of demonstrating. The same report that noted the banners, issued that
an “estimated 979 women and 595 children were intercepted and detained on 20 Oct.”56
While the demonstrations ended on October 20th, 1961, La Bataille de Paris
continued in the hearts and lives of those impacted by this violent fight for social and
political freedom. In total, it is reported that 14,094 men were taken into custody between
the period 17-19th of October57. In addition to the men detained, it is estimated between
40-200+ men died from injuries sustained during the demonstrations. The actual number
is unknown due to the lack of records. In contrast, three officers died during the four days
of protests, and Papon records only 3 deaths to the Assembly. Jean-Luc Einaudi and Jean
Paul Brunet, the two leading historians on this case for the first 30-40 years after the
event, differ on their conclusions concerning the amount of demonstrator deaths. Einaudi
adamantly insists upon the estimation of more than 200 deaths. Through his interviews
and recollections of witnesses, his search narrowed him down to the number of: 210. On
November 6th of 1961, the police visited the center identification of Vincennes, it was
reported that 1,500 French Muslims resided there. Yet upon reporting it to the National
Assembly, the number 1,710 French Muslims was reported.58 Einaudi believed the
number of 210 makes up for the amount of men that the police estimated lost their lives.
Brunet sides more on that of the French, blaming the FLN for the deaths and expressing
his estimate as 40 deaths. Other historians have similarly shared their estimations, allranging from 40-200. As to the exact amount, it will never be known; bodies were found
in the Seine days, weeks, and months after. Some from the demonstrations, maybe some
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from other violent outbreaks. What is known is that many Algerian families suffered loss.
Numbers of around 1,000 men did not return home to their families as they were deported
back to Algeria, and many women were left without answers as to the fate of their
husbands.59 While the 1,500 women and children were all released, they returned to
empty homes, many still missing their husbands and fathers. The four days of the
demonstrations involved more than simply the repression of a people, it propelled the
repression of lives, neglecting the memory of those who lost their lives for the sake of
freedom.

ID Photos of Algerian men arrested during the manifestations
Police reactions:
Reactions regarding the demonstrations of the FLN began as soon as the first
march took place. In the case of the police, many officers had preconceived arguments,
concerning their position or attitude towards the Algerians. The police did not react in
solidarity. Those who agreed and took part in the violence saw the ever-growing
independence of Algeria as frightening, and those who had accepted Algeria gaining its
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independence did not see the sense in the violence. As stated earlier in the chapter, when
the call for preparation came, some officers gathered their bidules (clubs), anticipating
the violence to come. Many officers involved in the manifestations were men that had
previously worked in colonial Algeria under the French military. The colonial ideals
promoted violence and aggression, pushing the idea that even in a foreign country they
were the ones in charge. The ideals were carried back to France and allowed for the
discrimination to augment. House and MacMaster express it well in the statement,
“Police repression was descending into open racism, targeting men by the color of their
skin, and into acts of torture that had last been seen in France under the Nazis.”60 And
Paris adapted to these horrific ideals until the violence and unnecessary discrimination no
longer seemed foreign, but something that was natural and thusly employed so. The high
morals of equality for all manifested the reverse as repressive tendencies of exclusion and
violence.
As a result of the growing violence amongst the police force, specifically
concerning the demonstrations of October 17th and the days that followed, the press
began to accumulate evidence against the Prefect and his police officers. Papon intended
for all the officers to unite against the information contained in the documents, which
criticized and blamed the police for violence and murder, but lack of agreement amongst
the Prefecture led to a compromise. The role of blame no longer was to be enforced by
the SGP (Syndicat général de la police) Conseil, the highest of the police unions; instead
the convictions were to be decided by parliamentary of judicial level. An officer at a SGP
meeting on November 7th, remembered the night as shocking: “I saw abominable scenes,
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colleagues who fell with all their weight onto a North African lying on the ground in a
coma… Once order was restored, why beat them to death with kicks and punches in the
police-stations, why massacre them?”61 The feelings of dissent ran deep amongst the
police in France, but these were not nationally shared. Some officers were rightly
revolted at the discrimination and violence. As the SGP was not in the position to decide
who should be held responsible or make the decision of whether or not the accusations of
brutality were true, the French government—De Gaulle—became the primary decider.
The responsibility of punishing the police was rightly entrusted to both De Gaulle and
Papon, the superiors of France, but what benefit would this provide the Algerians
wronged if as those responsible, they knew and ignored the brutal repression the entire
time?
While France was slowly relinquishing its control of Algeria in the 1960’s, the
change in political and social roles heightened the already strained relationship between
Algerians and the French. France had imposed a French way of life upon colonial
Algeria, ensuring the law and social life to adhere to the standards of France. The people
of France knew Algeria only as one of France’s colonies, so upon the initiation of French
withdrawal from the colony, Charles de Gaulle employed an increase of military presence
in Algeria to distract the French from the loss as he did not want to alarm those who were
in opposition to Algerian Independence. During this time de Gaulle was deeply involved
in the process of continuing France and Algeria’s relationship, consequently when the
FLN demonstrations occurred, de Gaulle concentrated on the current events in Algeria
and neglected to intervene/involve himself in the affairs in Paris. De Gaulle saw Algerian
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independence as inevitable, and that Algeria needed to become independent, as Algerians
were not French to de Gaulle.62 In 1959 at a dinnertime discussion, de Gaulle notes that
the problem of colonization was the French tried to make Algerians French, but they
could not be. De Gaulle is recorded saying, “ ‘You cannot possibly consider that one day
an Arab, a Muslim, could by the equal of a Frenchman?”63 Making France a political and
economic world player prevented de Gaulle from personally handling the horrors that
were happening in his own home. The preoccupation led him to appoint and trust in a
man that did not have the concern of all people in his heart, Maurice Papon. De Gaulle’s
neglect of attention to the event has not been very widely commented on. Historians
touch on his inattention, as House and MacMaster state,
“De Gaulle was fully prepared to intensify repressive action against the FLN and
generally approved of Papon’s role as Prefect of Police since he was a loyal
Gaullist servant firmly under the eye of the Paris government and, in particular, of
the Prime Minister Michel Debré who was quite willing to resort to state terror
against the Algerian nationalists. De Gaulle aimed to reverse the military
appropriation of civil police powers in Algeria, but was less concerned by
Papon’s militarization of the Paris police.”64
La Bataille de Paris did not deem itself an event major enough to distract de Gaulle from
the important process of decolonizing Algeria and promoting France.65 He entrusted
Papon with the responsibility of handling the Algerian national “radicalism”, believing in
Papon’s “no nonsense” style of maintaining order in Paris, apparently even if this
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involved violent measures.66 While the demonstrations only spanned four days, their
impact spanned decades. The disinterest of the major French leader on such an important
event only furthered the French mentality of repression and collective memory loss.
The lack of involvement from de Gaulle in the French state spurred more
situations where the state was willing to overlook the evidence within the official
commission of inquiry, which took place on October 27th with the Paris Council, October
30th with the National Assembly, and October 31st with the Senate.67 As information
leaked that contradicted the reports of Papon and Roger Frey, the Minister of Interior,
evidence accumulated against the men in power. On October 30th, the National Assembly
examined the cases brought against the Paris police, which accused the French police,
specifically Papon, of repressing men of color and “the unleashing of ‘the hideous beast
of racism.’’68 The next day in the Senate, Papon and Frey were once again openly
confronted, yet this time more evidence of their violent tactics of police racism had
erupted. A commission of inquiry was opened against them. But Papon and Frey had
prepared for this possibility and knew that the ordonnance of 17 November 1958
prevented a commission of inquiry being opened in regards to a case currently under
judicial review as this case was. It was discovered that judicial investigations of the
numerous corpses found after October 17th had not been opened like they typically were,
but instead shelved and neglected until October 30th when they were rediscovered and
registered. This took place the same day as the meeting of the proposal for the
commission of inquiry. Papon was guilty of this “blocking tactic” in 1953 and 1962. Thus
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the accusations were out-maneuvered and the issue, while it was scheduled to continue
until early December, was neglected and no longer relevant by early November.69 The
cases disappeared into the shadows as each one was disregarded and pushed to the side
by the French government until the seal was closed on the issue. Papon managed to
remain unscathed from a battle he initiated, and his men followed suit without any
scratches on their record.
Maurice Papon, the Prefect of Police:
The culture of manipulation and discrimination only amplified in the midst of the
demonstrations, allowing the police to overlook their actions of brutality while
simultaneously actively seeking validation for their actions. And so a “perversion of
justice” endured.70 One could say the most involved man in the “perversion of justice”
was Maurice Papon, the Prefect of Police in Paris from 1958 to 1967. Due to the
necessity of de Gaulle’s attention abroad, Papon, a man trained in the brutal colonial
oppressive measures, was given full reign of the Parisian police system during these four
years of the Algerian War. This does not imply that de Gaulle would have reacted any
differently or more justly handled the events. Through de Gaulle’s action of appointing
Papon as the man in charge, de Gaulle took full responsibility for Papon’s corruption as
he instigated such actions by neglecting his country’s problems during such a tense time.
Through his transfer of power to Papon, de Gaulle promoted and can be associated side
by side with the violent methods of the Prefect of Police. Papon’s method of command,
classified as “the Papon System”, can be closely related to that of the Vichy era. Similar
to the techniques used on Jews during WWII, “the Papon System” employed the use of
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regular round-ups to detention centers and discriminatory policies such as the night
curfew against the Algerians. The goal was to promote separation and distinguish those
who were different as bad. Accepting these callous handlings of the situations instilled
the repressive tendencies in Papon’s own manner of policing.
“Papon’s strategy was to manipulate public opinion by diverting attention away
from well-documented evidence of police-violence towards anonymous and
dubious accusations that could not be substantiated.”71
Papon manipulated numerous people to keep his secrets and withhold the truth. This
deceitful behavior lasted for decades, infringing upon every role he took part in. Even at
his trial in 1996, Papon would not admit to his wrongdoings in 1961.72 Papon discusses
his heroism in his autobiography entitled, Les Chevaux du Pouvoir (Horses of Power). In
addressing his deeds involving the deportment of Jews and the violent repression of
Algerians, Papon manages to romanticize actions that killed thousands and withheld
liberties from thousands of others. House and MacMaster illustrate this well in their
statement,
“Papon claimed the no massacre had taken place, the FLN gunmen had fired at
the police from the safety of the demonstration in order to provoke a bloodbath,
and that his men had shown valiant self-discipline in containing a dangerous
assault on the seat of government during which only two Algerians had died.”73
Through the trial and the study of Papon’s misdeeds, it can be seen that there was
a larger driving force behind the violence and suppression of human rights that he was
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involved in. It was the French government who elected him the Prefect of Police, aware
of his aggressive tendencies in colonial Algeria. De Gaulle, conscious of Papon’s
involvement in the Algerian killings, awarded Papon the Légion d’Honneur the same
year as the Paris massacre. Why was he rewarded for his violent tactics? Why would the
French government appoint a man of such discriminatory values if those were not also
their values? This will be discussed further in the Conclusion when the links through
history are regarded in relation to the present.

Maurice Papon, Prefect of Paris Police circa 1940s
Reaction of the Press:
The night of the event photographers and journalists followed the crowds,
attempting to capture the chaos before their eyes. But censorship of the press during the
war prevented many from publishing what they had captured, afraid of backlash by the
police. The French government was not the only one involved in the “burying” of
information. The GPRA (Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne) would
not let current events of violence or discrimination interfere with the negotiation process
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that was moving towards finalizing independence.74 The cover-up of the events was
called an acte forclos, a term invented by Michel Laronde.75 This term refers to the act of
preventing media from publishing the events, or completely shutting one out of an event.
Despite French and Algerian attempts to cover-up the violent results of the police
involvement in the demonstrations, media soon began publishing the official story issued
by the police. Chapter 3 will go more in detail on the extent to which the media published
this. What can be said is that the reaction of the media to the repression of the state
violence was not obedient. This chapter has used two extremely renowned texts on the
event written by historians: Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory by Jim
House and Neil MacMaster and La Bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961 by Jean-Luc
Einaudi. Einaudi uses the testimony of journalists, police, and witnesses—any and
everyone involved—he includes their stories to build an account of the event. This aids in
the compilation of memories of the demonstrations. House and MacMaster’s text
provides a chronological mapping of the events, pinpointing those involved while also
combining discovered artifacts to recreate the event. Both of these texts are both widely
regarded and discussed as they provide wide-ranging information on October 17, 1961
with varying opinions integrated into the narratives.
While news of the event was kept “hush-hush” in France, i.e. not circulated or
discussed till years, decades after, the FLN demonstrations found its way into newspapers
around the world. Unsurprisingly, the international press reaction proved to be greater
than that of the French, due to the lack of censorship in neighboring nations and beyond.

House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. 156
Laronde, M. “Effets d’histoire: Représenter l’Histoire colonial forclose,” International
Journal of Francophone Studies, 10/1+2: 139-155, 2007) 147

74
75

46

Instances appear “In the Absence of the Archives”, where articles and books were written
in response to the massacre, but they found no leverage in France due to the
government’s power of control and voice. Moreover the international press was not
intimidated by the French state, and chose to publish the “un”official story. Pakistan,
Egypt, India, and Ghana published blatant words against the violence of the French
police, the story of violence receiving most attention by the Third World. K.S. Karol is
recorded to have stated that due to the silence from the West, “’the West as a whole will
ultimately have to pay the price for the Paris Pogrom.’”76 Western nations like Britain
and the United States showed concern over the fate of the Algerian people who felt that
they had to demonstrate, but the West sympathized only so far. The response ultimately
varied according to ideological considerations with nations spouting similar stories of the
massacre or “lack of”.

“By the thousands, Algerians manifested yesterday in Paris.” October 18th, 1961
Critical publications of the official report or addressing the police repression were few
and far between in France, but some newspapers like L’Humanité and Libération lightly
discussed the violence that occurred.77 What helped the most in spreading knowledge was
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the publication of narratives or eyewitness accounts of the demonstrations used in
newspapers like Libération, Témoignage, and Le Monde who all published accounts from
people or letters of witnesses.
Reaction of the French Public:
“If the events of “October 17”—a sobriquet of convenience and the rhetorical
embodiment of the massacre’s failure to find traction in the national narrative—
have long been repressed in the French collective psyche, it is not simply a result
of the efficiency with which police operations made the event invisible, but rather
the product of complex institutional forces that conspired to render the historical
record invisible, foreclosing—for nearly 50 years—the possibility of
historiographical operations.”78
The government and police readily overlooked the aftermath of the violence they
had allowed to develop, and thus the French public did the same. The public learned from
their leaders, ignoring that which seemed insignificant or unproblematic to their own
lives. The public witnessed the scenes of violence and lived through the displays of
police brutality. The demonstrations occurred in the streets and the heart of Paris. It was
not possible for the public to entirely overlook the events, but the influence of their
political leaders imposed such ideas of ignorance that the French public willingly went
along. The public trusted the word of the police and such naïve allegiance permitted the
public to be blinded from the truth that was seeping out of the press little by little. This
cannot be said for every individual as there were the cases of doctors and train workers
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who tried to speak out against the violence but were stopped from repeating what they
had seen, thus silencing their moral voice.
The French public did not disregard the brutality of the French police. While the
inquiry of the case may not have been successful, it did bring forward people to speak
against Papon and the police repression. According to an article in Le Monde from
November 1, 1961, during the Senate inquiry, Muslim students gathered to object to the
violence suffered by Algerians and declare their solidarity.79 House and MacMaster
discuss the rising up of humanitarian left-wing protests in response to the inhumane
actions of the police.80 People saw this as a large political occurrence that could bring
more tension to racial relations. Paul Rousseau, a delegate of the SGP in the 10th
arrondissement, could not understand the reasoning of the French’s brutal tactics,
“Mais croyez-vous qu’emprunter le chemin de la violence aidera à résoudre une
question dont le gouvernement cherche encore la solution acceptable?”81
“But do you believe that taking the violent path will help resolve a problem for
which the government is still searching for an acceptable solution?”
Despite people such as Paul Rousseau who was on the inside of the event happenings, the
general voice of the French public has been assumed as uninterested and uncaring. The
years after resulted in few outbreaks against the French state. People were afraid of
change and refused to challenge the official discourse, in turn, the French public realized
the violence that had taken place but continued to live under a government that allowed a
massacre to happen in their streets. The repression was not the cause of the people, but
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the institutionalized exclusionary tendencies of the French allowed for the government to
overlook those who did comment on the injustice of police treatment against Algerian
protesters.
The Impact of the Repressive Violent French State
The FLN, passionate about a movement towards equal social liberties and
political voice, rose up to peacefully protest an exclusionary curfew put in place by the
Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon in 1961. Yet the institutionalized exclusionary policies
and brutal tactics of coercion employed in colonial Algeria impacted the methods of the
French state causing the French police to transform a peaceful act of demonstrating into a
battle in the heart of Paris. These same practices prompted officers to commit acts of
brutality against people who sought only the same liberties as the officers. Through the
examination of the French state during the decades before the massacre, all sources point
to the state as the issue. The state encouraged the censorship, manipulation, brutality, and
dishonesty that bred the repressive officers and government of France, in turn infiltrating
the public and promoting the forgetting of the October 17th, 1961.
As Chapter two has examined the events of October 17th, 1961 and its after effects
of collective memory loss, Chapter three will analyze three important sources of
information that came in response to the massacre: a satirical newspaper, a novel, and a
film. Similarly, Chapter three will utilize the three primary sources to demonstrate the
impact of the French state’s repressive behavior on public memory. These sources
pinpoint key sections of time since the massacre where the revelations of memory have
been interpreted by through different means.
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CHAPTER THREE: The Use of a Satirical Newspaper, a novel, and a film to
convey memory of October 17th, 1961

As the French government dealt with the repercussions of a violent state outbreak
in their capitol, the media scrambled to take advantage of the government’s gap in
attention, hoping to share with the world the monumental events of the past several days.
Yet despite the numerous assemblies and growing suspicion of the government members,
the police maintained a strong hold on the media. This is not to say that the media was
uninvolved in the process. Quite the opposite, newspapers released accounts the day after
October 17th, rallying against the Algerian protesters and imposing the police verified
story of FLN violence. Le Monde and France-Soir initially supported the police version,
and other newspapers just as Le Parisien Libéré, L’Aurore, Paris-Match likewise went
along with the idea of Algerian brutality, claiming it supported the opinion of “the
aggressive nature” that most media outlets formed of Algerians82. It was not until three or
four days following the start of the event that newspapers began to question the validity
of the police reports and publications emerged stating that the demonstrations had been
largely peaceful. The expansion of knowledge brought further questioning to the police
and witnesses started emerging. Initially, the news circulated in the hub of Algerian
bidonvilles, limiting knowledge of those who were not in the Algerian sphere of Paris.
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But as the police version lost traction among the newspapers, the testimonies and
narratives grew in circulation, amplifying the public’s attention.
This chapter will concentrate on three sources of information that provide unique
perspectives on October 17th, 1961. Throughout the years following the demonstrations,
certain decades have produced revivals of La Bataille de Paris such as in 1981 when a
few select French historians were able to view the police archives, while other times have
repressed the event further. The three sources—a satirical newspaper, a novel, and a film,
emerge in three different periods, with each source representing varied access to
documents, media outlets, etc. of the demonstrations. The range of periods will aid in
understanding the gradual progression of knowledge of the repression, followed by
knowledge of the initial reaction of the police, media, and public. Gradually from
newspaper to novel to film, more information became readily available. It needs to be
reiterated that public information throughout the decades after the event has been
extremely limited. Due to the delayed classification of official archives, an agreed upon
version of the demonstrations was not possible, and that still does not exist in the present.
With such dissonance in mind, it must be acknowledged that some sources carry biased
arguments while others try their best at an impartial version, relying on witness stories to
corroborate the events.
Upon analyzing sources that provide key information regarding October 17th,
1961 at varying points of time, the reoccurring repression emphasized throughout
Chapter two will take a different approach in this chapter. While the collective repression
within France will still persist for decades after, a timeline of anamnesis intervenes and
has begun to prevail in the recent decades. Anamnesis is the recalling of memory or the
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recollection of something, bringing past things to the present. This is to say that there has
been a very gradual process of recalling of memory through different methods and
varying sources. Newspaper publications such as L’Express and Esprit emphasized that
such violent events had been occurring for decades under French rule in colonial Algeria
and the current war in Algeria. Les Temps modernes did not want to differentiate between
the actions of the Vichy state and the actions of 1961, but they were the few who
criticized the police as going too far.83 Newspapers first began the recount of the event,
but then subsided as other events quickly took the center stage, like the Charonne
massacre of 1962, which prompted more national and international coverage than that of
the Algerian massacre of 1961.84 The responsibility of recall then came to develop
through novels, as they offered an unveiling of the events without a blatant reveal. Key
leaders could be renamed, geography was changed, but the cover-up of state violence
against Algerians remained the same. When select historians were finally able to review
closed documents by the French government, this allowed for the event to gain ground
within the historical realm. Specifically the texts discussed in Chapter two by Einaudi and
Brunet, concentrate on records that were not released to the public until decades later. But
when the archives were finally opened in October 2011, overwhelming amounts of
information came out.85 While there were many films throughout the decades before, the
declassification of the archives prompted more visual productions as at last photographs
and videos that had been confiscated were released. Lia Brozgal proposes a term to
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describe the effects of such a late declassification of an event, “anarchive.”86 The satirical
newspapers, texts, films, etc. that emerged using classified police documents, has allowed
for “unofficial” stories to have just as much significance as the recently released
“official” stories. Essentially, due to the unique circumstances involving the archives of
October 17th, the “official” and “unofficial” stories have no superiority over the other.
“Anarchive” literally refers to being without an official state archive—the lack of
archive. France had already repressed these events in the memory of the public by
denying involvement and quickly moving on. As a result, the continued repression in the
state’s archives created a voracious need amongst journalists and the public for
information.
“Over the course of the five decades that followed, the police archives of October
17 were subject to regulations that prevented their transmission to the public (a
category which included not only the casually curious but also eminent historians
and journalists). Historical accounts of October 17 began to emerge in the mid1980s; in light of the classified status of the police archives, however, scholars
relied on other forms of documentation (FLN archives, eyewitness testimony, and
coroner’s records) to ground analyses often in contradiction with one another.”87
Brosgal refers to the “absence” or void that existed due to the “classified” documents. It
is this “absence”, which spurred the movement of satirical newspaper articles, fictional
texts, and films that has compiled stories to “fill in” the gap of information erased by the
French state through these “unofficial” archives, anarchives.
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Satirical Newspaper: Le Canard enchainé
While there exist archives and cabinets containing physical copies of these
publications, the majority of the newspapers and stories surrounding the early weeks after
the event are not to be found online. The limited online presence makes it difficult for
researchers who do not have the time or resources to thus track down hard copies of such
articles. Yet there are still publications that surface from time to time online. The
publication from a satirical newspaper that was found on E-bay will be analyzed to
identify the significance of this “anarchive”—what was learned through pieces of
unconventional information on the Algerian massacre such as this satirical article that
produced knowledge on the event despite the police’s repressive action?
Published on October 21, 1961, only days after the event, this publication is
written in a manner as to poke fun at the police. Le Canard enchaîné, meaning The
Chained Duck or The Chained Newspaper, is a satirical newspaper founded in 1915
during World War I. Due to it being a publication in a satirical article, the government
was less likely to vehemently oppose its release. The newspaper features leaks and
investigative journalism looking at inside sources of the French government, the French
political world, and the French business world. Typically, publications address a variety
of issues, concentrating on news events, political and social. The publication is composed
of an 8-page format, of which, 5 articles will be analyzed. As this is a satirical newspaper,
the publications are all written with a political, social, or economic goal in mind. The
publication of October 21, 1961 has the title, “Comment ça va le monde?—Caïn—chaos”
(How is the world doing—Cain—chaos), which immediately references the recent events
on the streets of Paris. The five articles that will be discussed from the publication all
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refer to the events of October 17, 1961. The formats differ from a normal article to that of
a comic. These five texts clearly indicate the knowledge of the FLN demonstrations
within Paris, and the fact that despite pressure from the government, information was still
being spread.
Article 1: “Le Marmite de Papon” (The Blitz of Papon)
The publication begins with a traditional article that covers half of the first page,
reading “Le Marmite de Papon” (The Blitz of Papon). The “Bombardment”, “attack”,
“onslaught” of Papon—all negative words that concentrate on the harmful impact of
Papon’s influence. The focus of this article is a metaphorical “bomb” that has exploded
on Paris and those responsible are Maurice Papon and Roger Frey, the Minister of
Interior. As a result of this “bomb”, unknown fallout is inevitable, but whom will it
affect? In the article, the bomb is referred to as the bomb “Haine” because the “bomb”
embodied the police violence and brutality during the demonstrations, the hate that the
police had bottled up against the Algerians. Released in response to the seven years of
war raged between France and Algeria, it resulted in chaos. The “clean” bomb of “Haine”
made for a dirty war. The police seemed to massacre without any consequence to them.
Paris is outraged by this bomb, what will the fallout mean for them? But the author of the
article, R. Tréno, states it could result in the loss of la nation française, l’âme française
(the French nation, the French soul). The reparations of such violent acts could cost the
nation its very soul. What does this mean for those who instigated the “bomb”? Tréno
decries Papon and Frey, mocking them, “Belle besogne, monsieur Frey! Joli travail,
monsieur Papon!”(Beautiful job, Nice Work) And who assisted you the author asks? The
police agents respond Papon and Frey enthusiastically. This article provides open
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disapproval of Papon and Frey’s actions. Much emphasis is placed upon Papon and his
involvement, his culpability that does not appear to phase his heroic vision of himself.
“Capable à la fois de defender la ‘patrie du socialisme’ et de détruire toute l’humanité”
(Capable at the time of both defending “the homeland of socialism” and destroying all
humanity. The accusations against Papon are not small. The satirical article makes it
obvious that the atrocious deeds of Papon are public news; it is just up to the public as to
whether or not they want to believe. Questioning his colleagues, Tréno asks, “Well my
colleagues, what have you heard of the “bomb”, ‘cette bombe Haine’? “You don’t know?
I doubt that.” Even journalists denied acknowledgement of the events, despite seeing
articles and being blatantly prevented from publishing certain things by the police. Tréno
ends the article by stating, “It would be an honor for me to be dragged to the courts. I
would not be the only one, thank you God.” The courts no longer have authority over the
people of France. How can they when they allow rampant brutality by those leaders who
are supposed to enforce the law?
This article against Papon supports the aforementioned information of Papon’s
guilt yet continued excused behavior. Tréno clearly points out that the problem did not lie
solely in the hands of Papon and Frey who issued for the police officers to take action.
No, the problem is a deeper institutional illness that had infected all the branches: the
police, the courts, the people of France, and the soul of France.
Article 2: “Cinglante réplique au F.L.N.” (Scathing response to the FLN)
The second article in this publication that references the FLN demonstrations
provides a satirical account of an OAS march. This article lives up to the legacy of Le
Canard enchaîné by sarcastically recounting an OAS march and emphasizing the French
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government’s blatant acceptance of the OAS and its terrorist agenda, which prompts a
“scathing response” to the approach of the French police. The police concentrate their
violence on the terrorists they see most guilty, the FLN, while the OAS who are just as
guilty of sabotage and assassinations receive none of the police repression. The article
begins slowly, explaining the events of the march, members of the OAS gather together,
chanting in the streets, crying, “Algérie française” (French Algeria). Then quickly the
article takes a turn toward the absurd, illustrating the ease of an OAS march. The
“scathing response” as the title insists, is rather the opposite. Instead of the protesters
being arrested and detained, beaten while they wait, they are driven to salons, attending a
little party. Then the Interior minister instructs the police to not interrogate the protesters
too much, as they will soon be back in their groups again, repeating the same thing. The
mocking tone is heavily imposed. The article is clearly doing so in reference to the
complete opposite treatment of the FLN march. It is obvious the author, Jean-Paul
Grosset, knows the truth of the FLN demonstrations and of the violence that the police
demonstrated used against the protesters, yet the OAS experienced all the grace of the
French police. Grosset’s “scathing response” is intriguing as it provides a fairytale picture
of what the OAS experienced while the FLN received the brunt of the police retaliation.
How did the French government justify their unfair treatment of the two terrorist groups?
Such repressive tendencies to overlook the truth of an issue brings to surface many
problems. Through the words of Grosset, it is easy to believe the scene of police
preference to those of their own kind as colonial Algeria institutionalized such racism,
but it is difficult to grasp how such unequal treatment of two groups could be justified.
Article 3: “Le festival des aveugles” (Festival of the blind)
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At the Palais des Sports, a scheduled concert to be performed by Ray Charles was
postponed till later as the arena was one of the places used as a detention center. This
article by Gabriel Macé, involves the mocking of the demonstrations, entitled: “Le
festival des aveugles” (The festival of the blind). There is a comic illustration on the side,
which shows two cops escorting Ray Charles away from his concert venue Palais des
Sports and towards the Parc des Expositions, which was also used to detain protesters.
The figure of Ray Charles is captioned saying, “Mais puisque je vous dis que je suis Ray
Charles!....” (But I’m telling you that I am Ray Charles!) It brings to light the extreme
racial discrimination within France.88 Anyone with black or dark skin was assumed to be
the current “bullied” ethnicity of the time. As in this case, Ray Charles, an American
singer, is mistaken for an Algerian violating the night curfew. He is grouped together
with the protesters that occurred a couple days before because of the color of his skin.
Article 4: “Le flic aux Africains” (Cop to the Africans)
Instead of a traditional article, this excerpt has bullet points asserting the
relationship between North Africans and the police, stating comments like, “violent
clashes between Algerians and the guardians of the peace”, the tension is perceived
throughout France. Algerians are made out in this passage as the problem, ces fous (these
crazies). They bring their drama and live in the bidonvilles or under the bridges… These
points of declaration about the relationship between the police and Algerians assert
clarity on the demonstrations, condensing the week of events into a matter of lines. The
author, Jean-Paul Grosset (the same author as the first article), sarcastically refers to the
Algerians as the ones who have brought upon the violence, but it is obvious in his
Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War the Remaking of
France.

88

59

opinion it is really the police who are to blame. The police do not fear the violence of
North Africans, they are just happy to arrest them. Frey and Papon are once again
mentioned. Frey’s advice is to send the Algerians back to their country of origins. The
police are violent, and they disregard the emotions and liberties of North Africans. These
points reiterate the control of the police and the lack of voice that North Africans had; the
relationship was one of inequality. It was this inequality that pushed Algerians to protest,
and it was this inequality again that allowed the police to cover-up their violent hand in
the demonstrations.
Article 5: “Comment se faire ‘discriminer-racial’”—a comic (How to racially
discriminate)
The last of the articles is rather a comic, a “how to” on being racially
discriminating. The comic gives steps on the process, tinged by sarcasm directed at the
French state. The process is as follows: 1. Make sure to notice the difference of skin color
in your surroundings 2. Paint yourself green 3. Wait till 11:30pm then stick some feathers
in your hair or cap 4. Go point at your workplace “avec d’autres puent-la-bière des
Jerrycanvillie environnants” (with other stinky beers from the surrounding Jerrycanville)
5. Then go discreetly get the attention of the gentlemen police 6. Make acquaintances
with them 7. From there, they will bring you to a meeting place, which has hot whiskey
8. Finally they will kindly bring you back home around 5am 9. Where your wife listening
to the raccoon’s family is waiting for you in tears The comic is poking fun at the
demonstrations, making reality into something of dress-up, a game. Instead of presenting
the negative relationship between police and the person of color, the comic makes it seem
like a fun outing where upon meeting the police, they will bring you to a party and then

60

escort you home. This was in essence what the French public wanted to believe had
happened between the police and Algerian protesters. Similar to the other pieces in Le
Canard enchaîné, this comic strip emphasizes the lack of attention to the severity and
violence that surrounded the events of October 17, 1961. The first days after, even
newspapers still believed the official report of the police, which claimed, “that the police
had dispersed a demonstration which the mass of Algerians had been forced to attend by
militants and ‘gun shots were aimed at the police forces who returned fire.’”89 Most mass
publications—Le Parisien Libere, L’Aurore, Paris-Match, recounted the official version.
While these few articles have referenced and illustrated that knowledge of the police
repression existed, it should be understood that this was not widespread. It required
months, years, and decades for awareness or the reality to be raised. The repression of the
event denied the punishment of those responsible and acknowledgement of their
wrongdoing.
While the police were not able to repress all counter-narratives, the French collective
sentiments opposed critique of the police. Yet pieces like those from Le Canard enchaîné
were still published and found their way through the repression. The pieces all
demonstrated the knowledge that was available yet overlooked days after October 17,
1961.
Novel: Meurtres pour mémoire (Murder in Memoriam)
The following source that conveys the repression of memory of the Algerian
massacre is a fictional book, Meurtres pour mémoire (Murder in Memoriam), written in
1983 by Didier Daeninckx. This fictional account provides an intriguing historical
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perspective that occurs two decades after the massacre. As the archives are still not
available when this book is written, the author uses anarchives to fill in the missing
“path” of the story. Rather than these anarchives being confined to one place, they can be
found anywhere. Lia Brosgal points out that these anarchives rely on subjective
experiences in the absence of actual archives. 90 Daeninckx demonstrates this technique in
his novel, using a fictional observer of the riots in order to discuss the violent
demonstrations that were still hush-hush during the 1980’s in France and bring up past
taboo events that involved the French government. In fact, there are several examples of
other novels written on the event, which similarly reference the Algerian massacre
through fiction: William Gardner Smith, The Stone Face (1963); Georges Mattei, La
geurre de gusses (1982); Nacer Kettane, Le sourire de Brahim (1985); Medhi Lallaoui,
Les beurs de Seine (1986) Leila Sebbar, La Seine etait rouge (1999). All of these novels
offer fictional treatment of October 17th, 1961 to bring together collective memory of the
event and make gathered information more available to the public, even if these novels
are not actual “archives”. As can be observed from the dates of publications, the majority
of these novels were published around two decades after the demonstrations, except for
The Stone Face published in 1963.
Daeninckx’s murder novel takes place in Toulouse, France and follows the
investigation of two deaths and the secrets behind these deaths, but underlying the plot is
the subject of October 17, 1961. The first death is of the father Roger, the witness of the
Algerian massacre, who was assassinated by a member of the OAS, and the second is of
his son Bernard, who was researching the father’s history in the archives of Toulouse and
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then was murdered. The investigator, Cadin helps to bring the secrets out of the shadows
and implicate the Parisian police official as the one responsible. The story follows the
investigation of this high-ranking official in the Paris police department, who closely
resembles the profile of a real life Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon. Secrets are revealed
of 1940’s France and 1960’s France, times of corruption and immoral doings by the
French government. The 1940’s saw French police involved in the deportation of French
Jews to concentration camps. Some believe that Daeninckx’s novel had a role in bringing
Papon to trial over his involvement in the deportation of Jews91. While searching for
answers, the book also educates the audience on the two hidden histories of France, and
how the repression of these events impacted the average person.
Through the eyes of investigator Cadin, the audience is provided ample
information on Drancy, the Jewish concentration camp, and the Algerian massacre, and
information evolves to discover a connection between the similar police treatment of the
two situations. This is where Papon’s fictional character’s role in both affairs comes to
the surface. Daeninckx emphasizes that the past must be known to understand the
present. Through the discovery of police involvement in Jewish deportation during the
Occupation, more came to be understood of the violent demonstrations in Paris during the
Algerian War. Known for his use of history in literature, Daeninckx bases the Algerian
massacre as the subplot of his narrative to “throw History live and kicking into literature,
to make it spew up the things it usually doesn’t talk about.” 92 He uses a mystery novel as
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an anarchive to draw people in and inform them on an issue that happened 20 years
earlier.
Film: “Ici, on noie les algériens” (Here we drown Algerians)
Released in the wake of the 50th anniversary of October 17th, 1961 by Yasmina
Adi, “Ici on noie les algériens” (Here we drown Algerians) offers a visual representation
of the FLN manifestations that arose in response to the night curfew imposed against
Algerians in Paris during the Algerian war of independence. The documentary describes
the events of the evening, the prompting of the night curfew and the aftermath of what
was meant to be a peaceful march. The documentary opens to the scene of a widowed
woman riding in a car across what appears to be a bridge, and then the camera pans to
water, la Seine, where the tragedy of the forgotten, chaotic event overflowed. Despite the
event having occurred five decades earlier, the despair and loss that the police wrought
upon the Algerian demonstrators can be felt in the tone of the witnesses and videos in the
documentary. Radio clippings of police broadcasts, protester testimonies, and video clips
from the demonstrations are included in the documentary, presenting more factual
evidence than many of the sources before had the capability of including. While the
documentary “Ici on noie les algériens” is not the first of documentaries or films on the
Algerian massacre, unlike others it provides unseen material and ample interviews of
witnesses; people who marched, people who lost loved ones, doctors involved in
bandaging the injured. But the same story is told throughout the dozens of sources: a
peaceful Algerian march was turned violent by the involvement of the French police.
Rather than the satirical approach of the newspaper or the historical fiction
approach of the novel, what can be inferred from the documentary is rather a collective
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experience. The film offers emotional connection through the stories and personal
narratives of the eyewitnesses and protesters interviewed. Rather than a single voice
describing the events, several perspectives are shared, presenting a collaborative effort.
The voices together embody the common sentiments of the crowd: hurt, despair, loss,
confusion, and powerlessness. The theme of the film does not reflect the power hungry
“chase” that the police sought, instead Adi approaches the event through the narrative of
those involved, demonstrating the moral, human dimension within the brutality of the
Algerian massacre. The title of the documentary opens up the film with a very heavy
feeling: “ici on noie les algériens” (Here we drown Algerians). This phrase is closely
associated with the Algerian massacre, as days after the demonstrations it was painted on
a quay alongside the Seine but quickly erased. The removal of this slogan could not be
erased from the minds and hearts of those who took part in the demonstrations. They
marched alongside men who drowned; they lost loved ones and felt as if they were
drowning in the sea of chaos and violence brought on by the police brutality.

“Ici on noie les algériens” (Here we drown Algerians) written on the Pont du SaintMichel
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A crowd of 30,000 Algerians gathered to make their cry for liberty and equality
heard. Real newspapers that were displayed in the film labeled the event, “Puissant
Mouvement” (Powerful movement). While the Puissant Mouvement describes the
outbreak of violence initiated and carried out by the police, what is remembered more
than the amount of protesters or the initial goal of peace is the brutality demonstrated by
the state. The violent manifestations are nicknamed, “honteuse chasse à l’arabe” (the
shameful hunt of Arabs). Photo after photo in the documentary display the fear in the
faces of the protesters. Their lives were at stake due to their race. The racial
discrimination that enforced the law of French authority in Algeria continued to carry
weight in France. One of the protesters states in his testimony, “Our goal was only to free
ourselves from colonization, to finally be able to live a life where we could decide our
life.”(31:18-28)93 The radio clips, tactics, and terms used by the police against the
Algerians employ superiors over inferiors. Such blatant discrimination is seen throughout
the week of FLN demonstrations, but specifically on October 20th when the women
marched in the absence of their arrested husbands. The women interviewed remember
asking the police questions about their husbands’ arrests, but the only response was the
police arresting them in turn. And yet the women continued to participate in the
demonstrations—980 women and 550 children were taken into the hands of the police
(54:10).94
While some of the clips used in the film did not resurface from the archives until
50 years after the massacre, through several documentaries such as “Ici on noie les
algériens”, moments and memories of the massacre have been preserved despite the
93
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French state trying to promote their version of the event that left out much of the truth.
Film is capable of visually revealing the events, thus allowing some to relive the event
while others the opportunity to understand and see the truth. Despite best attempts to
remain neutral, in books and articles, the bias of the author is always involved. In the case
of the documentary, the bias of both sides can be overlooked to a certain extent and the
public can see the events through the eyes and words of those who experienced the
peaceful demonstrations turn violent. Those interviewed, more so than archives, provide
living memory of what occurred on October 17, 1961 that for so long has been hidden
away.
Adi makes it known that despite the recovery of archives and “memory”, the full
truth has not yet been told or acknowledged. The film ends with the headline of
newspaper after newspaper reporting the discovery of North Africans in the Seine that
appeared soon after the demonstrations, but this headline did exactly what the police
wanted to do. It refrained from drawing attention to Algerians or police violence and
instead prompted thoughts on the deaths of North Africans, offering none of the
important details that go along with October 17, 1961. It was just as the French police
wanted it, their violent actions were not recorded, and the people they repressed were not
remembered clearly. The newspapers appear to be floating in the water that carries so
much weight of the Algerian massacre. The water where bodies of protesters came to rest
and the water that covered-up the truth of October 17, 1961. Answers have not been
given to many of the questions asked by the protesters and witnesses. Questions remain
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despite the decades that have passed. “The victims still wait for the French government to
recognize their responsibility in the event.” (1:26:47)95
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Conclusion: The Reappearance of Memory

French discrimination traces back to colonial times, founding the relationship of
Algeria and France on unequal terms. France emphasized their superiority through
political and social control, determining Algerian’s liberty in the nation of Algeria. This
relationship of superiority vs. inferiority continued in France, and the state persisted to
aggravate the relationship with the many restrictions placed upon Algerian immigrants.
Specifically, Charles De Gaulle, Maurice Papon, and the French police corroborated in
government neglect against the FLN, overlooking obvious acts of injustice, which they
committed. In 1961, violence escalated when peaceful protests planned by the FLN
branch in Paris were smothered by police brutality. While bits of information were
released, the “official” police report lacked much of the truth. The public quickly moved
on to other issues, and the media did not have the information to further pursue such a
restricted event. Despite the immediate state cover-up and declassified archives, over
several decades the event leaked out through bits and pieces of anarchive sources.
The recovery of the Algerian massacre has been a tedious process, spanning
decades. Some of the pieces that have uncovered the repressed information were
analyzed in this thesis. In Chapter one, the history of Algeria and France’s relationship
was examined to understand the beginning dynamics between the two nations. As the
turmoil between the two grew during the Algerian war, Chapter two comes into focus,
and the specific event of October 17th, 1961 is discussed in detail. A narrative is
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presented to guide the reader through the extremities of state involvement and police
violence in the FLN protests. In Chapter three, three primary sources expand upon the
events of October 17th, 1961. These sources are published in varying times following the
Algerian massacre, and thus rely differently on anarchives versus the declassified
archives. From the narrative of primary and secondary sources, a reliable description and
understanding of October 17th, 1961 has been forming over the last 30 years. The
memories that were repressed and forgotten by the French have resurfaced thanks to the
perseverance of historians and the memories of those involved in the Algerian massacre.
The French state permitted a select few French historians to examine the
classified archives, but not until October of 2011 were the state archives declassified to
the public, making the information available 50 years after October 1961. Yet this small
success has meant little in the grand scheme. In 2001, France placed a plaque along the
quay by the Seine in honor of the lives lost to the Algerian massacre, it reads: À la
mémoire des nombreux Algériens tués lors de la sanglante répression de la manifestation
pacifique du 17 octobre 1961 (In memory of the many Algerians killed during the bloody
repression of the peaceful demonstration of October 17th, 1961). But at this time, not even
the French state had recognized their repression of Algerian deaths resulting from the
demonstrations, as state official reports only recorded two deaths. The declassification
came after the plaque in 2011, and a year later on October 17th, 2012; François Hollande
acknowledged the massacre of Algerians in France.96 This became the “first
governmental recognition of police culpability in the events of October 17”.97 To this
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day, the French government has not recognized the possibility of more than 43 deaths
from the demonstrations, which is the lowest estimation of any historian. More than
protests, La Bataille de Paris led to the suppression of truth regarding the lives of 200
lives. France is still trying to find its way to confront their wrongdoings of the past and
admitting to the institutional racism within its nation’s history.
What can be concluded from the research and sources analyzed is one thing in
particular: it was not only one person who orchestrated or influenced the state repression
and violence that resulted in such a catastrophe. Rather than blaming Maurice Papon or
placing all the responsibility on the French state or accusing the French public as the
problem, the conclusion can be reached that multiple forces played a part in the Algerian
Massacre. De Gaulle, Papon, and the French police were all components of this nationwide repression, which allowed rampant discrimination and oversaw violent interference
in peaceful led demonstrations. So how could the French government appoint two men
and employ police of such discriminatory values if those were not also their values?
Obviously, France allowed this to happen. The French state and public were complicit in
the cover-up of the violence. Despite not openly identifying with such violence, their
silence has spoken volumes of the inherent discrimination exclusionary policies passed
on from French colonialism in Algeria to the heart of France.
In order for reparations to be made, “anamnesis” has to occur.98 Memory of the
event must be brought to the surface and acknowledged by those who for so long
smothered the memory. These sources allow the public to see the progression of
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acceptance of memory, which has grown throughout the years as access to documents
and police imposed bans have been lifted. Journalists, authors, filmmakers have used
their creative outlets and mixed that with the known and rumored information to build
anarchives or “archives” of memory. Memory has gained much ground surrounding the
Algerian massacre in Paris. While memories and moments of the demonstrations have
been lost due to the years of unofficial knowledge and hush-hush, which surrounded and
continue to surround the massacre, knowledge and memory about October 17, 1961 still
prevail. The lack of archives did not withhold curiosity or investigation into the subject,
as can be seen in the sources above.
When beginning this thesis, I planned to analyze French repression and inherent
discrimination throughout many levels of the French sphere through a longer timeframe
while concentrating more on the modern events. After being introduced to the Algerian
massacre and reading the extent of repression that was laced in with the demonstrations,
the purpose of this thesis changed to revolve solely around one circumstance of
repression of state imposed violence: October 17th, 1961.

“17th October 1961: we do not forget!”
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